rel_T_rne.Rd
The idea of a TRNE is that only for a finite number of T periods relational contracts will be newly negoatiated. After T periods no new negotiations take place, i.e. every SPE continuation payoff can be implemented. For fixed T there is a unique RNE payoff.
rel_T_rne( g, T, delta = g$param$delta, rho = g$param$rho, adjusted.delta = NULL, beta1 = g$param$beta1, tie.breaking = c("equal_r", "slack", "random", "first", "last", "max_r1", "max_r2", "unequal_r")[1], tol = 1e12, save.details = FALSE, add.iterations = FALSE, save.history = FALSE, use.cpp = TRUE, spe = g[["spe"]], res.field = "eq" )
g  The game 

T  The number of periods in which new negotiations can take place. 
delta  the discount factor 
rho  the negotiation probability 
adjusted.delta  the adjusted discount factor (1rho)*delta. Can be specified instead of delta. 
beta1  the bargaining weight of player 1. By default equal to 0.5. Can also be initially specified with 
tie.breaking  A tie breaking rule when multiple action profiles could be implemented on the equilibrium path with same joint payoff U. Can take the following values:

tol  Due to numerical inaccuracies the calculated incentive constraints for some action profiles may be vialoated even though with exact computation they should hold, yielding unexpected results. We therefore also allow action profiles whose numeric incentive constraints is violated by not more than tol. By default we have 
save.details  if set TRUE details of the equilibrium are saved that can be analysed later by calling 
add.iterations  if TRUE just add T iterations to the previously computed capped RNE or TRNE. 
save.history  saves the values for intermediate T. 