Fix action profiles for the equilibrium path (ae) and during punishment (a1.hat and a2.hat) that are assumed to be played after the cap in period T onwards. The punishment profile a1.hat is the profile in which player 1 already plays a best-reply (in a1 he might play a non-best reply). From the specified action profiles in all states, we can compute the relevant after-cap payoffs U(x), v1(x) and v2(x) assuming that state transitions would continue.

Fix action profiles for the equilibrium path (ae) and during punishment (a1.hat and a2.hat) that are assumed to be played after the cap in period T onwards. The punishment profile a1.hat is the profile in which player 1 already plays a best-reply (in a1 he might play a non-best reply). From the specified action profiles in all states, we can compute the relevant after-cap payoffs U(x), v1(x) and v2(x) assuming that state transitions would continue.

rel_after_cap_actions(g, x = NA, ae, a1.hat, a2.hat, x.T = NA)

Arguments

g	a relational contracting game created with rel_game
x	The state(s) for which this after-cap payoff set is applied. If NA (default) and also x.T is NA, it applies to all states.
ae	A named list that specifies the equilibrum action profiles.
a1.hat	A named list that specifies the action profile when player 1 is punished.
a2.hat	A named list that specifies the action profile when player 2 is punished.
x.T	Instead of specifiying the argument x, we can specify as x.T a name of the after-cap state. This can be refereed to as the argument x.T in rel_state and rel_states

Value

Returns the updated game